In the light of the entire factual scenario, particularly, the objection relating to bias which came to be raised at the fag end of the trial that is on the eve of passing orders, as observed earlier, we are not inclined to entertain such objectio..

In the light of the entire factual scenario, particularly, the objection relating to bias which came to be raised at the fag end of the trial that is on the eve of passing orders, as observed earlier, we are not inclined to entertain such objection. The Presiding Judge, in our view, will take note of the grievance expressed and eliminate the apprehension of the appellant. It goes without saying that every litigant is entitled to fair justice.13) Independence of judiciary is the basic feature of the Constitution. It demands that a Judge who presides over the trial, the Public Prosecutor who presents the case on behalf of the State and the lawyer vis-a-vis amicus curiae who represents the accused must work together in harmony in the public interest of justice uninfluenced by the personality of the accused or those managing the affairs of the State. They must ensure that their working does not lead to creation of conflict between justice and jurisprudence.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

The considered view that materials on record do not show that Shri P. Chidambaram had abused his position as a Minister of Finance or conspired or colluded with A. Raja so as to fix low entry fee by non-visiting spectrum charges fixed in the year ..

The considered view that materials on record do not show that Shri P. Chidambaram had abused his position as a Minister of Finance or conspired or colluded with A. Raja so as to fix low entry fee by non-visiting spectrum charges fixed in the year 2001. No materials are also made available even for a prima facie conclusion that Shri P. Chidambaram had deliberately allowed dilution of equity of the two companies, i.e. Swan and Unitech. No materials is also available even prima facie to conclude that Shri P. Chidambaram had abused his official position, or used any corrupt or illegal means for obtaining any pecuniary advantage for himself or any other persons, including Shri A. Raja. 

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

The appellant had neither received the bribe money nor was he present at the spot when the same was received by the co-accused, who handed over the same to `M', but the involvement of the appellant did not require his presence at the time of t..

The appellant had neither received the bribe money nor was he present at the spot when the same was received by the co-accused, who handed over the same to `M', but the involvement of the appellant did not require his presence at the time of the raid as he was connected with the offence in view of Ex.PR which was the paper on which the meter reading was jotted down allegedly by the appellant. Ex.PR was proved by the handwriting expert to be in the handwriting of the appellant. In that context, the question whether the opinion of the handwriting expert could have been relied upon without examining him was relevant. The report of the fingerprint expert who was not examined, indicated that a specimen writing was given by the appellant and on a comparison of the same with the writings in Ex.PR, the fingerprint expert came to the conclusion that they were written by the same person. The trial court skirted the issue by holding that the defence could have examined an expert to rebut the report. The High Court recorded that the report having gone unrebutted could be relied upon without any demur. The views of the trial court as well of the High Court in that regard cannot be accepted. When the trial court chose to rely on the report of the handwriting expert, it ought to have examined the handwriting expert in order to give an opportunity to the appellant and the other accused to cross-examine the said expert. There is nothing on record to show that the appellant and the other accused had admitted the report of the handwriting expert. Both the trial court and the High Court erred in denying the appellant such opportunity and shifting the onus on him to disprove Ex.PR which was not formally proved by the prosecution. It was only the report of the handwriting expert, Ex.PY, which connected the appellant with the offence on account of Ex.PR which was said to be in his handwriting. Since the appellant had neither received the money nor was he present at the spot from where the other accused were apprehended, his case has to be treated on a different footing and since his complicity was not established beyond doubt on the basis of Ex.PR and Ex.PY, he must be given the benefit of doubt. The impugned order is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The expression `with or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age' in s. 375, Clause `Sixthly' of the Show

Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The expression `with or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age' in s. 375, Clause `Sixthly' of the Penal Code, 1860 assumes importance where a victim is under sixteen years of age. In the instant case, the prosecutrix had no formal education and, therefore, there is no school certificate available on record. In the FIR, the age of the prosecutrix has been stated to be 13 years. The prosecutrix in her statement u/s 164, Cr.P.C., and her elder brother (PW-1) in his deposition stated her age as 13 years at the relevant time. However, the doctor (PW-5), on the basis of the X-ray as well as physical examination of the prosecutrix, opined that she was 17 years of age. The trial court on consideration of the entire evidence recorded a categorical finding, and rightly, that the prosecutrix was about 17 + years of age at the time of occurrence and, therefore, Clause Sixthly of s.375 IPC is not applicable. [para 10] [419-H; 420-A-C] 1.2 The High Court conjectured that the age of the prosecutrix could be even 19 years. This appears to have been done by adding two years to the age opined by PW-5. There is no such rule much less an absolute one that two years have to be added to the age determined by a doctor. In the instant case, the brother of the prosecutrix has been examined as PW-1 and, therefore, it cannot be said that best evidence has been withheld. 

A defect or irregularity in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or procedure relating to cognizance or trial. Therefore, where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to term..

A defect or irregularity in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or procedure relating to cognizance or trial. Therefore, where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigation does not vitiate the result unless a miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. The defect or irregularity in investigation has no bearing on the competence of the court or procedure relating to cognizance or trial. [Para 8] [259-D-E] 2.2 In the instant case, the Investigating officer has mentioned in the FIR itself that he had orally been directed by the Superintendent of Police to investigate the case. There is nothing on record to show that the officer's statement is not factually correct. It is evident that there was a direction by the Superintendent of Police to the concerned officer to investigate the case. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the issue as to whether the oral order could meet the requirement of law remains merely a technical issue.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Held: Since s.7 as well as s.13 of the Show

Held: Since s.7 as well as s.13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act provide for a minimum sentence of six months and one year respectively in addition to the maximum sentences as well as imposition of fine, claim for grant of relief under the Probation of Offenders Act is not permissible - In cases where a specific provision prescribes a minimum sentence, the provisions of the Probation Act cannot be invoked - No valid ground to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court - Appellant to surrender and to undergo remaining period of sentence - Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 - Penal Code, 1860 - s.477A. State Through SP, New Delhi v. Ratan lal Arora 2004 (4) SCC 590: 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 631 and State Represented by Inspector of Police, Pudukottai T.N. v. A. Parthiban 2006 (11) SCC 473: 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 35 - relied on. Case Law Reference 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 631 relied on Para 8 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 35 relied on Para 8. 

Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 Section 19 (1) of the Show

Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 Section 19 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 postulates that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable u/ss 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction. The said provision enumerates about the competent authorities. In the case at hand, the competence of the authority who has granted sanction is not in question. [para 5] Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab 1958 SCR 762 =1958 AIR 124 and Basdeo Agarwala v. Emperor AIR 1945 FC 18 - referred to Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King AIR 1948 PC 84 - referred to 1.2 From the decision of this Court, the following principles can be culled out: a) It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning authority after being satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out. b) The sanction order may expressly show that the sanctioning authority has perused the material placed before him and, after consideration of the circumstances, has granted sanction for prosecution. c) The prosecution may prove by adducing the evidence that the material was placed before the sanctioning authority and his satisfaction was arrived at upon perusal of the material placed before him. d) Grant of sanction is only an administrative function and the sanctioning authority is required to prima facie reach the satisfaction that relevant facts would constitute the offence. e) The adequacy of material placed before the sanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the court as it does not sit in appeal over the sanction order. f) If the sanctioning authority has perused all the materials placed before him and some of them have not been proved, that would not vitiate the order of sanction.

A distinction, the foundation of which is classes of the establishments and classes/kind of persons, who frequent the establishments and those who own the establishments cannot be supported under the Constitutional philosophy so clearly stated in ..

A distinction, the foundation of which is classes of the establishments and classes/kind of persons, who frequent the establishments and those who own the establishments cannot be supported under the Constitutional philosophy so clearly stated in the Preamble to the Constitution of India and the individual Articles prohibiting discrimination on the basis of caste, colour, creed, religion or gender. The Preamble to the Constitution of India as also Arts. 14 to 21, as observed in I.R. Coelho* form the heart and soul of the Constitution. Taking away of these rights of equality by any legislation would require clear proof of the justification for such abridgment. [para 100] *I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. Vs. State of T.N. 2007 (1) SCR 706 = 2007 (2) SCC 1- relied on. 1.2 Section 33A (1) (a) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 prohibits holding of a performance of dance, of any kind or type, in any eating house, permit room or beer bar. This is a complete embargo on performance of dances in the establishment covered u/s 33A (1) . Section 33A contains a non-obstante clause which makes the section stand alone and absolutely independent of the Act and the rules. Contravention of s. 33A (1) makes it a criminal offence and on conviction offender is liable to punishment of 3 years. On the other hand, the establishments covered u/s 33B enjoy complete exemption from any such restrictions and dance performances are permitted provided the establishments comply with the applicable statutory provisions, Bye- Laws, Rules and Regulations. [para 98] 1.3 The classification of the establishments covered u/ss 33A and 33B would not satisfy the test of equality. The distinction is made on the grounds of "classes of establishments" or "classes of persons, who frequent the establishments" and not on the form of dance. There is no justification that a dance permitted in exempted institutions u/s 33B, if permitted in the banned establishment, would be derogatory, exploitative or corrupting of public morality. Rather it is evident that the same dancer can perform the same dance in the exempted institution u/s 33-B but is prohibited of doing so in the establishments covered u/s 33A. There is no rationale which would justify the conclusion that a dance that leads to depravity in one place would get converted to an acceptable performance by a mere change of venue. The discriminatory attitude of the State is illustrated by the fact that an infringement of s. 33A (1) by an establishment covered under the said provision would entail the owner being liable to be imprisoned for three years by virtue of s. 33A (2) . On the other hand, no such punishment is prescribed for establishments covered u/s 33B. Such an establishment would merely lose the licence. Such blatant discrimination cannot possibly be justified on the criteria of reasonable classification under Art. 14 of the Constitution. [para 100-101] State of Jammu and Kashmir Vs. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa AND OTHERS 1974 (1) SCR 771 = 1974 (1) SCC 19
E.V. Chinnaiah Vs. State of A.P. AND OTHERS 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 972 = 2005 (1) SCC 394
Budhan Choudhry Vs. State of Bihar 1955 SCR 1045 = AIR 1955 SC 191
Laxmi Khandsari AND OTHERS Vs. State of U.P. AND OTHERS 1981 (3) SCR 92 = 1981 (2) SCC 600 - relied on. Radice Vs. People of the State of New York 264 U.S. 292 (1924) - cited. 1.4 Once the respondents had given prima facie proof of the arbitrary classification of the establishments u/ss 33A and 33B, it was duty of the State to justify the reasonableness of the classification. The appellants have failed to justify by acceptable evidence, inevitable consequences or sufficient materials that the restriction, whether partial or complete, is in public interest and contains the quality of reasonableness. There was little or no material on the basis of which the State could have concluded that dancing in the prohibited establishments was likely to deprave, corrupt or injure the public morality or morals. [para 100-101 and 104] 1.5 The so called distinction is based purely on the basis of the class of the performer and the so called superior class of audience. It cannot be presumed that the class to which an individual or the audience belongs brings with him as a necessary concomitant a particular kind of morality or decency. The presumption which runs through ss. 33A and 33B that the enjoyment of same kind of entertainment by the upper classes leads only to mere enjoyment and in the case of poor classes it would lead to immorality, decadence and depravity, cannot be accepted. Morality and depravity cannot be pigeon-holed by degrees depending upon the classes of the audience. The said presumption is also perplexing on the ground that in the banned establishments even a non-obscene dance would be treated as vulgar. On the other hand, it would be presumed that in the exempted establishments any dance is non-obscene. The underlying presumption at once puts the prohibited establishments in a precarious position, in comparison to the exempted class for the grant of a licence to hold a dance performance. The presumption is elitist, which cannot be countenanced under the egalitarian philosophy of the Constitution. Thus, ss. 33A and 33B introduce an invidious discrimination which cannot be justified under Art. 14 of the Constitution. Yet at the same time, both kinds of establishments are to be granted licenses and regulated by the same restrictions, regulations and standing provisions. [para 102-103] Charanjit Lal Chowdhury Vs. Union of India AND OTHERS 1950 SCR 869 =AIR 1951 SC 41
Ram Krishna Dalmia Vs. Justice S.R. Tendolkar 1959 SCR 279 =AIR 1958 SC 538
State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Kaushailiya AND OTHERS 1964 SCR 1002 = AIR 1964 SC 416
and Shashikant Laxman Kale AND ANOTHER Vs. Union of India AND ANOTHER 1990 (3) SCR 441 =1990 (4) SCC 366 - referred to. 1.6 A perusal of the Objects and the Reasons would show that the impugned legislation proceeds on a hypothesis that different dance bars are being used as meeting points of criminals and pick up points of the girls. But the Objects and Reasons say nothing about any evidence having been presented to the Government that these dance bars are actively involved in trafficking of women. Isolated examples would not be sufficient to establish the connection of the dance bars covered u/s 33A with trafficking. Therefore, it cannot be said that the ban has been placed for the protection of the vulnerable women. [para 105] 1.7 The Legislature is free to recognize the degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. Further, the State may direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, but such conclusion have to be reached either on the basis of general consensus shared by the majority of the population or on the basis of empirical data. The State neither had the empirical data to conclude that dancing in the prohibited establishment necessarily leads to depravity and corruption of public morals nor was there general consensus that such was the situation. The three reports presented before the High Court in fact have presented divergent view points.

Demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non for constituting an offence under the Show

Demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non for constituting an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Mere recovery of tainted money is not sufficient to convict the accused, unless there is evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the money was taken voluntarily as a bribe. While invoking the provision of statutory presumption u/s 20 of the Act, the court is required to consider the explanation offered by the accused, if any, only on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and not on the touchstone of proof beyond all reasonable doubt. However, before the accused is called upon to explain how the amount in question was found in his possession, the foundational facts must be established by the prosecution. The complainant is an interested and partisan witness, concerned with the success of the trap, and his evidence must be tested in the same way as that of any other interested witness. In a proper case, the court may look for independent corroboration before convicting the accused.

The view taken by the trial court drawn on the evidence on record is unreasonable and perverse and the High Court has rightly interfered with the order of acquittal and convicted the appellant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of Pr..

The view taken by the trial court drawn on the evidence on record is unreasonable and perverse and the High Court has rightly interfered with the order of acquittal and convicted the appellant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. [Para 11] [446-C-D] Kalyan Singh v. State of M.P. (2006) 13 SCC 303; T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401; State represented by Inspector of Police, Pudukottai, T.N. v. A. Parthiban (2006) 11 SCC 473 - referred to. 1.2 The evidence of the complainant is found to be consistent and impeachable regarding the demand of Rs.500/- by the appellant as bribe money for giving favourable report in regard to the grant of permanent lease holder rights of the land to the complainant. His evidence is supported by contemporaneous documents prepared by the Investigating Officer before the money was delivered to the appellant. The complainant emphatically denied the suggestion of the appellant that Rs.500/- was sent to the appellant by DW-1 as repayment of the loan amount. The complainant, the investigating Officer and other witnesses who were present when the appellant was caught red handed by the Anti Corruption Team have been cross-examined at length by the defence, but nothing tangible has been extracted from their evidence to create any shadow of doubt that they are not truthful witnesses. They have given reliable and consistent version of the crime and their evidence inspires confidence. [Para 9] [465-F-G-H; 466- A] 1.3 Once it is proved that the money was recovered from the possession of the appellant, the burden of presumption as contemplated u/s. 20 of the P.C. Act, 1988 shifts upon the appellant, which he could not rebut through cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing reliable and convincing evidence to prove that DW-1 advanced Rs.500/- as loan to the appellant through the complainant. [Para 9] [464-H; 465-A] 1.4 DW-1 has not given any reason why he chose the complainant alone to deliver a sum of Rs.500/- to the appellant on the day when he was apprehended by the Anti Corruption Team

The High Court analysed in great detail the evidence to show that the alleged animosity was not established. Two witnesses PWs 2 and 3 in detail had referred to the factual scenario and nothing discrepant has been brought on record to cast any dou..

The High Court analysed in great detail the evidence to show that the alleged animosity was not established. Two witnesses PWs 2 and 3 in detail had referred to the factual scenario and nothing discrepant has been brought on record to cast any doubt on the credibility of their evidence. [Para 6] [648-B] 2. Day in and day out the gigantic problem of corruption in the public service is on the increase. Large scale corruption retards the nation- building activities and everyone has to suffer on that count.Corruption is corroding like cancerous lymph nodes, the vital veins of the body politics, social fabric of efficiency in the public service and demoralizing the honest officers. The efficiency in public service would improve only when the public servant devotes his sincere attention and does the duty diligently, truthfully, honestly and devotes himself assiduously to the performance of the duties of his post. [Para 7] [648-C-E] Swatantar Singh v. State of Haryana (1997) 4 SCC 14 and State of M.P. v. Shambhu Dayal Nagar (2002) 1 SCC 1, relied on. 3. Considering the peculiar facts of the case, the custodial sentence of one year, which is minimum prescribed, would meet the ends of justice. [Para 8] [648-F] Case Law Reference: (1997) 4 SCC 14 relied on Para 7 (2002) 1 SCC 1 relied on Para 7 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 2009. From the Judgment and Order dated 11.9.2007 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Appeal No. 416-SB/1996. Manoj Prasad for the Appellant. Kuldip Singh, R.K. Pandey, T.P. Mishra and H.S. Sandhu for the Respondent.